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One of my colleagues at the Gender Institute has a brilliantly coloured collage on her 
office door, presented to her by her students, that defiantly proclaims ‘Theory Saves 
Lives’.  As this suggests, the notion that theory of any kind matters is contested, 
perhaps particularly in environments where there is a sense of urgency about political 
and social change. Precisely elaborated theoretical distinctions that threaten to make 
no practical difference can seem as pointless as those apocryphal debates about the 
number of angels that can dance on a pin-head; and when one’s mind is trained on 
issues of violence, poverty, or discrimination, it is hard to avoid impatience with those 
who airily leave questions of feasibility to another day. The complaint often levelled 
at ‘theory’ is that it fails to engage with the complexities of the real world.  But at 
least with ‘theory’ the failure may be inadvertent: the theorist may have thought 
herself saying something highly pertinent, but in the eyes of her critics has failed.  
With ideal theory, the charge sheet will be considerably longer, for ideal theory does 
not just fail, incidentally, to address real world complexities; it actively chooses to set 
these to one side.  
My concern in this paper is with an aspect of liberal egalitarian thought that 
might be regarded as proof against such criticism, a development that could be 
recommended, to the contrary, for its realism. This is the now almost universal 
acceptance that a plausible conception of an egalitarian society must accommodate 
itself to the existence of markets in goods and labour. Grand treatises on justice or 
equality that nowhere mention money, markets, or capitalism present us with an 
almost insurmountable task of translation; while condemnations of the market as 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Ciaran Driver, Marc Fleurbaey, Ingrid Robeyns, Adam Swift and an anonymous reader 
for their comments on an earlier draft. 
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simply immoral and unjust immediately beg – and have commonly ducked - the 
question of what, then, we are supposed to do. It would be hard to find examples of 
either such approach in the current literature. With the demise of communism (in both 
theory and practice), and widespread recognition that any foreseeable future will 
involve some version of a market economy, even egalitarians have accommodated 
themselves to this.2 A significant number go further, deploying the virtues of the ideal 
market in their condemnation of its often corrupt realities.   
Though I share the concern with feasibility, I am troubled by this turn towards 
the market; and especially troubled by the claim that there are sound egalitarian 
reasons for endorsing markets in goods and labour. Endorsements in the name of 
efficiency already risk invoking an idealised version of ‘the market’ that bears little 
relationship to the often failing markets of the real world. Endorsements in the name 
of equality mostly make it clear that it is market as ideal type, not as actual practice, 
that is said to promote equality. Yet here, too, the idealising move risks blunting the 
critique of actual market operations, because of the difficulties in disentangling ideal 
from real. Features from the operations of actual markets may be mistakenly 
incorporated into descriptions of the ideal, in ways that pre-empt more radical 
alternatives; or substantive norms associated with market societies may be written in 
to what are presented as neutral market ‘mechanisms’. From the other side, persistent 
features of actual markets may be treated as anomalies or irrelevant corruptions, in a 
manner that recalls distinctions between ‘explaining’ and ‘explaining away’.3 My 
suspicion, in other words, is that it is not so much the egalitarian accommodation with 
markets that is the source of my unease, but the fact that this accommodation so often 
operates through ideal theory.  
In what follows, I start with some illustrations of the turn towards the market 
in liberal egalitarian political thought, and go on to distinguish three distinct meanings 
that can be attached to the notion of ideal theory.4 I have deliberately broadened the 
                                                 
2 Alex Callinicos (2000) Equality, Polity Press, is one valiant exception, but even he describes his 
alternative as ‘outside the bounds of contemporary common sense’ and  requiring a ‘revival in utopian 
imagination’ (132-3). 
3 In his critique of contract theory, Charles Mills is particularly scathing of a tendency to represent 
racial injustice as an anomaly, and the ‘unhelpful and ultimately evasive abstracting away from 
questions of race’. Mills (2007) ‘Contract of Breach: Repairing the Racial Contract’: 108, in Carole 
Pateman and Charles W Mills Contract and Domination Cambridge, Polity Press.  
4 I focus in this paper on liberal egalitarian thought, and do not address the further literature on market 
socialism. Had I done so, I suspect I would have found a richer and more contextualised understanding 
of markets.  
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term beyond its reference point in John Rawls’ distinction between ideal and non-
ideal theory, for I see the over-emphasis on Rawls’ definition as itself an unhelpful 
narrowing of debate. Within each of the three meanings, I consider ways in which the 
deployment of ideal theory creates problems in theorising the relationship between 
equality and the market. My own view, to state it from the outset, is that differences 
between one kind of market society and another are going to become increasingly 
important in the development of egalitarian alternatives, and that questions about the 
compatibility of equality with the market will come to focus more on the substance of 
market relations than a general principle of market exchange. Specificity matters here. 
Markets in what? how ‘free’ is the market? how regulated? What kinds of power 
hierarchies are established in what kinds of market in goods or labour? Which of 
these, if any, is compatible with principles of equality? Certain idealised ways of 
talking about ‘the market’ are unlikely to help in answering such questions.  
 
Modes of market accommodation 
One dominant mode of market accommodation follows a pattern laid out by Rawls, 
where the theorising is self-consciously ideal, and the market enters as an (also 
idealised) ‘fact’ of life that imposes efficiency constraints on distribution. The 
presumption, derived from ideal considerations, is in favour of an equal distribution of 
social primary goods, but this is to be modified where an unequal distribution turns 
out to the advantage of the least advantaged. The modification is itself justified in 
ideal terms (as what any rational person would choose), but its reference point is 
clearly market society, including what is taken to be the historically established 
relationship between competitive markets and economic growth, and the need for both 
profit and income differentials. Rawls himself explicitly assumes a free market 
system, while remaining agnostic on the precise role of private ownership.5 In doing 
so, he moves between an idealised version of the market (which ‘may then be used to 
appraise existing arrangements’6), and more historically contingent discussion of the 
relative merits of private property versus socialist regimes. He accepts entirely the 
efficiency claims made on behalf of a free market system, and regards it as one of the 
strengths of the difference principle that it makes justice compatible with efficiency.  
                                                 
5 ‘I assume in all interpretations…that the economy is roughly a free market system, although the 
means of production may or may not be privately owned.’ John Rawls (1971) A Theory of Justice: 66 
6 Rawls:272 
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Claims about market efficiency are not my primary focus, but it can already be 
said that this idealises the market in misleading rather than useful ways. Rawls’ 
deployment of an ideal is, of course, entirely deliberate, but his movement between 
idealised conception and historical actualisation is by no means precise, particularly 
when the ideal involves claims about historical tendencies. Consider, for example, 
how he deals with objections that the difference principle permits the most extreme 
disparities in income and wealth so long as the least fortunate receive just the slightest 
overall benefit: in his illustration, an extra billion dollars to the best off justified by 
another penny to the least advantaged.7 This is not, he argues, to be regarded as a real 
worry, because the just society will also enjoy equal liberties and positions open to all, 
and the widening opportunities associated with this will exert pressure on inequalities 
to keep them within acceptable bounds. ‘In a competitive economy (with or without 
private ownership) with an open class system excessive inequalities will not be the 
rule. Given the distribution of natural assets and the laws of motivation, great 
disparities will not long exist.’8  Yet this is surely a claim about the actual workings 
of actual market societies, to be tested against historical evidence, not deduced from 
the concepts themselves.  Rawls here fleshes out his ideal market with what might be 
thought an over-optimistic reading of how actual markets operate. 
It can also be said that Rawls’ account of efficiency falsely represents the need 
for incentives as integral to the workings of a free market, in ways that then place 
them beyond the scope of justice. In his famous criticism, G A Cohen likens the 
refusal of the talented to work for anything like the average wage to a kidnapper 
demanding ransom, and argues that it would be hard to sustain the incentive 
justification for inequality if the rich had to make their case for it when face-to-face 
with the poor.9 It is not, in this analysis, an ‘objective fact’ about markets that the 
talented have to be paid more, but something that derives from their own 
unwillingness, and Cohen argues that there would not be the same ‘need’ for 
incentives if the culture shifted in a more just and egalitarian direction. I take it as one 
implication of this that those who represent the need for incentives as definitionally 
integral to ‘the market’ have engaged in false idealisation.  In doing so, they commit 
                                                 
7 Rawls: 157 
8 Rawls: 158 
9 GA Cohen  (1992) ‘Incentives, Inequality and Community’ in G.B Petersen (ed) The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values, Vol  XIII Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press 
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us to more constrained and unequal consequences than the endorsement of markets as 
useful co-coordinating mechanisms need imply. 
A second line of argument, initiated by Michael Walzer, represents the market 
as relatively unproblematic in the way it regulates the distribution of money and 
commodities, but seriously out of place once allowed to influence the distribution of 
such matters as education or sex or health. ‘The merchant panders to our desires. But 
so long as he isn’t selling people or votes or political influence, so long as he hasn’t 
cornered the market in wheat in a time of drought, so long as his cars aren’t death 
traps, his shirts inflammable, this is a harmless pandering…the exchange is in 
principle a relation of mutual benefit; and neither the money that the merchant makes, 
nor the accumulation of things by this or that consumer, poses any threat to complex 
equality – not if the sphere of money and commodities is properly bounded.’10 The 
issue, for Walzer, is not whether the market as such is compatible with equality (it 
isn’t, strictly, but it does what it does well). The problem is that ‘money seeps across 
all boundaries’11, and the challenge for egalitarians is therefore to keep it in its place.  
Some of the feminist writing on prostitution or contracts for surrogate 
motherhood has followed a similar train of thought, taking issue not with the market 
per se as with the appropriateness of markets in women’s sexual or reproductive 
labour.12 In her critique of commercial surrogacy, for example, Elizabeth Anderson 
avoids the suggestion that the norms of the market are in principle unattractive or anti-
egalitarian, but focuses on where these norms legitimately apply. ’To say that 
something is properly regarded as a commodity is to claim that the norms of the 
market are appropriate for regulating its production, exchange and enjoyment’13: this 
suggests nothing particularly disreputable in market norms. The problem, for 
Anderson, arises when these are applied to the way we allocate and understand 
parental rights and responsibilities or the way we treat women’s reproductive labour, 
for when this happens, ‘children are reduced from objects of love to objects of use’ 
and women ‘from subjects of respect and consideration to objects of use’.14  
                                                 
10 Michael Walzer (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality Blackwell:110 
11 Walzer:22 
12 For example, Debra Satz  (1992) ‘Markets in Women’s Reproductive Labor’ Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 21: 107-31, and (1995) ‘Markets in Women’s Sexual Labor’ Ethics 106: 63-85 
13 Elizabeth Anderson (1990) ‘Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?’ Philosophy and Public Affairs,14: 
72.  
14 Anderson: 92.  
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Walzer’s approach is commonly regarded as the antithesis of ideal theory: he 
describes himself as ‘radically particularist’, grounding his normative claims in the 
shared meanings of existing societies, and standing ‘in the cave, in the city, on the 
ground’.15 Anderson also represents herself as a contextual theorist, more in tune with 
the classical economist’s understanding of the norms and institutions that constitute 
market society than the radical abstractions of their neo-classical successors.16 This 
particular mode of market accommodation is unlikely, then, to provide the best 
illustration for my thesis, but I include it as further evidence of the sustained turn 
towards the market in liberal egalitarian thought.  
A third mode of market accommodation fits more closely with my thesis, and 
is particularly associated with Ronald Dworkin. Writing in 1981, Dworkin noted that 
the market was widely perceived as the friend of efficiency and freedom but the 
enemy of equality.17 Egalitarians, by implication, had to balance out these competing 
concerns (perhaps – though he did not say this – along the lines suggested by Rawls). 
Against this, Dworkin endorsed the hypothetical market as an actively equalising 
force, arguing that ‘the idea of an economic market, as a device for setting prices for a 
vast variety of goods and services, must be at the center of any attractive theoretical 
development of equality of resources’.18  (This means, incidentally, that he is willing 
to see it applied in areas such as the provision of health, where Walzer would regard it 
as inappropriate.) Dworkin was not endorsing the actual operations of actual markets 
– far from it - but he drew on explicitly idealised models of the market, like the 
clamshell auction or hypothetical insurance market, to tease out the implications of 
equality of resources.   
In many ways, indeed, Dworkin’s use of an idealised market is more central to 
his arguments than the choice/circumstance distinction that subsequently became so 
                                                 
15 Walzer: xiv 
16 Elizabeth Anderson (2004) ‘Ethical Assumptions in Economic Theory: Some Lessons from the 
History of Credit and Bankruptcy’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7; see also (1993) Value in 
Ethics and in Economics  Cambridge, Mass.  Harvard University Press. 
17 Ronald Dworkin (1981) ‘What is Equality? Part 1 Equality of Welfare’ Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 10/3; (1981) ‘What is Equality? Part 2 Equality of Resources’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
10/4 These are reprinted virtually unchanged in Sovereign Virtue, so page references for quotes are 
from the later book.  
18 Ronald Dworkin (2000) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality Harvard University 
Press: 66 
 7
much associated with his work.19 He sees the market as an invaluable mechanism 
revealing to us the ‘true’ costs of our preferences, for it is through the market that we 
can work out what kind of burden our choices about our lives place on others.  The 
market (this is still the hypothetical, not the corrupted real one) delivers us the 
necessary combination of equality and respect for diversity, for with everything up for 
sale, at prices that reflect only what people are willing to pay, what each of us ends up 
with will be the unique combination of goods and services we really want. What is 
more, none of us will be making unreasonable – inequitable- demands on the others in 
getting it. In the hypothetical insurance market, for example, Dworkin imagines what 
the average person would be willing to pay to insure against the catastrophe of poor 
health or limited talent – how much risk she would be willing to bear, how much 
potential income she would be willing to set aside as protection – and uses this to 
tease out the true costs of preferences. If we were to ask people what they thought 
‘society’ or some unspecified other person should pay to protect them against 
misfortune, we might get very different answers. It is through focusing attention on 
what people are willing to pay themselves that we can get at their ‘real’ preferences. 
At the heart of Dworkin’s understanding of equality is the notion that ‘people 
should pay the price of the life they have decided to lead, measured in what others 
give up in order that they can do so (my emphasis)’.20  The market provides the 
mechanism for assessing what the social resources devoted to any one of us actually 
costs by measuring what these resources are worth to others. It also provides us with 
the best possible device for avoiding paternalism, perfectionism, arbitrariness, or just 
the disdain of those who do not happen to share our values. As Dworkin puts it, 
‘respect for the personal judgments of need and value that citizens have actually 
made, or would be likely to make under appropriate conditions’, in exercising 
responsibility for their own lives, is central to the hypothetical insurance market 
strategy. This makes it ’the very opposite of paternalistic’.21
To achieve all this, of course, ‘the market’ has to be very unlike the real 
markets we see all around us: most importantly, it has to be something we enter on 
(reasonably) equal terms. The clamshell auction on the desert island would have no 
credibility as a model of equality if the immigrants had struggled ashore with different 
                                                 
19 Dworkin himself did not initially use this distinction: it was Cohen who identified it as a defining 
theme in his work. GA Cohen (1989) ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’ Ethics, 99  
20 Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: 74 
21 Dworkin: 319 
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amounts of money or stolen from one another. ‘We must not lose sight of that 
fact…in any reflections on the applications of that argument to contemporary 
economic systems. But neither should we lose sight, in our dismay over the inequities 
of those systems, of the important theoretical connection between the market and the 
concept of equality of resources.’22  The object, at this stage, is ‘the design of an 
ideal, and of a device to picture that ideal and test its coherence, completeness, and 
appeal.’23 The market enters in what Dworkin describes as a positive but servile way: 
positive, because the model enables us to measure opportunity costs; but to be 
abandoned or constrained when analysis shows that actual markets have failed in this 
task.24  
Interestingly, Elizabeth Anderson also represents markets as actively 
equalising, though in an argument that stresses real, historical, markets rather than a 
hypothetical one. Anderson’s argument revolves around the way markets are 
embedded in particular laws of contract and generate movements for particular kinds 
of state regulation, and her argument is better understood as making a case for the 
virtues of particular forms of capitalism rather than the market per se.  Following the 
classical rather than neo-classical economists, she argues that a market-based 
economy is the only credible basis for a society of equals, because it dispenses with 
servile relationships. ‘Capitalism, by enabling ordinary people to make a living 
without depending on noblesse oblige, thereby transformed the moral economy of 
social standing to a more egalitarian and potentially universalizable footing.’ 25 Or in 
the famous quote from Adam Smith, ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest’26.  
When Smith said this, he was not only celebrating the co-ordinating force of 
self-interest. He was also pointing to the contrast with what he described as the 
‘servile and fawning’ way people used to have to ingratiate themselves with those 
they wished to do them a service. In a market society, we do not have to placate 
others; we just have to have the money. When we buy a good or  service, we are 
primarily concerned with what it costs and whether it meets our needs, and will not 
                                                 
22 Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: 70 
23 Sovereign Virtue: 73 
24 Sovereign Virtue: 112 
25 Elizabeth Anderson (2004) ‘Ethical Assumptions in Economic Theory: Some Lessons from the 
History of Credit and Bankruptcy’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7:352 
26 Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations Book 1, Chapter 2 
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(in principle) give a moment’s thought to who is selling it. When we decide which 
candidates to select for a particular job, we are primarily concerned with who can best 
carry out the work, and will not, in principle, give a damn about whether the 
candidates are male or female, black or white, recent migrants or from the oldest 
family in town. The very impersonality and anonymity of the market (what some 
critics have objected to under the rubric of alienation) is said to make it indifferent to 
distinctions of gender, race, or social status. In her endorsement of this, Anderson is 
clear that markets cannot embody relations of equality when people lack equality in 
bargaining power, and her vision of market society is one where everyone is secured 
against destitution, and there are laws protecting the rights of tenants against 
landlords, guaranteeing workers their right to organise into unions, preventing the rich 
from abusing their wealth to establish social hierarchies, and so on. As already noted, 
she also thinks the market must be kept firmly in its place, and is opposed to markets 
in women’s reproductive labour or markets in sex.  But like Dworkin, she regards the 
market as an important force for equality -  not so much, in her case, for teasing out 
what people really want or are prepared to pay, but in undermining relations of 
servility.27
These are big claims, but insofar as they are claims about markets as ideal 
types it becomes almost impossible to assess them. Even with Anderson’s more 
contextualised understanding of markets and capitalism, there is no easy way in which 
the realities of contemporary market society can be brought to bear in assessing the 
validity of the theoretical claims. Mountains of evidence about the inequalities and 
favouritism of existing markets will not of themselves prove the case, for these can 
always be taken as showing that the equalising powers of the market have not yet 
been fully unleashed. (This is part of what I mean when I say that arguments about the 
market and equality lend themselves to a tendency not so much to ‘explain’ as to 
‘explain away’.) The idea that market relations corrode older prejudices, for example, 
has to have something going for it: it cannot be total coincidence that the last fifty 
years has witnessed the greatest world-wide incorporation of women into the labour 
market and one of the most revolutionary periods yet as regards gender relations. Yet 
markets everywhere continue to be characterised by systemic differentiation by 
                                                 
27 See also David Miller (1989)  Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market 
Socialism Oxford, Clarendon Press.  for an endorsement of the anonymity and impersonality of the 
market. 
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gender and race. Are we to attribute this to the presence or the absence of markets, to 
their dominance or incomplete development? Since what is at stake is never pure 
market versus pure non-market (neither of which exists), it becomes almost 
impossible to determine whether the many contra-indications reflect the continuing 
strength of non-market forces or the absurdity of the notion that markets promote 
equality.  
In an earlier paper assessing claims – in this case, mostly by non-egalitarians - 
about markets eroding partiality and promoting toleration, Iain Hampsher-Monk noted 
that one of the difficulties in challenging such views was that no amount of empirical 
evidence about the persistence of discrimination was going to be recognised as 
decisive. ‘The market ideologue is apt to respond to apparent instances of the free 
market’s failure to realize its predicted virtues with the observation that the world 
must be falling short of the demanding characteristics of the ideal market and should 
be rearranged forthwith.’ 28 That the real world falls short may be regarded as a 
parochial irrelevance, for it is the ‘perfect market’, the ‘market as ideal type’, on 
whose behalf the claims are being made. Hampsher-Monk has a particularly ingenious 
response to this that I shall come back to later, but for the moment it is the general 
point that matters. Simply countering claims made on behalf of an ideal market with 
evidence of the deficiencies of actual markets will be derided as failing to understand 
the role of abstraction. When applied to egalitarian theorists who employ the 
hypothetical market precisely so as to highlight the imperfections of actual ones, it 
will be seen as entirely missing the point.  
In what follows, I do not directly address claims about markets promoting 
equality (though it will no doubt be apparent that I am sceptical of such claims). My 
question, rather, is whether the turn towards the market exemplifies one or more of 
what I distinguish as three idealising moves. If so, can it be said to illustrate some of 
the problems with those moves?  
 
1. The critique of abstraction  
Though we owe much of the current language of ideal and non-ideal theory to Rawls, 
I start with a different literature (one that has been more formative for me) that centres 
on the abstractions of the citizen or individual. This is primarily a feminist literature -  
                                                 
28 Iain Hampsher-Monk (1991) ‘The Market for Toleration: a Case Study in an Aspect of the 
Ambiguity of “Positive Economics”’ British Journal of Political Science, vol 21: 30 
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though we can trace an interesting line from Carole Pateman’s Sexual Contract to 
Charles Mills’ Racial Contract and on to Mills’ contribution to the critique of ideal 
theory.29 The main argument here is that the abstraction fails in its proclaimed 
neutrality. The figure of the white male lurks behind the innocently depicted citizen, 
excluding or marginalising the racialised and gendered other. 
In its origins, the abstract citizen or individual was entirely deliberate, and 
mostly well-intentioned. It was through differentiating what was essential from what 
was contingent that liberals and egalitarians were able to propose that we ignore 
social differences of wealth and status, overlook biological differences of ability and 
strength, and focus on what makes us all human, therefore deserving of equal respect. 
But the representation of the individual, not just as disembedded (the communitarian 
critique) but also as disembodied (the feminist critique) meant that features 
historically specific to particular groups of individuals got tangled up in the supposed 
abstraction. Most notably, the individual was conceptualised in the image of the male: 
the evidence for this, paradoxically, being precisely the extent to which the male body 
disappears from view. The male body becomes invisible as the taken-for-granted 
norm, while the female body (what Nirmal Puwar describes as the body out of 
place30) carries a burden of doubt, is associated with difficulties and problems, is 
thought to require ‘special’ treatment or concessions, and generally lacks authority. 
By the same token, those who constitute the dominant group have no racial or ethnic 
characteristics –they are able to figure simply as ‘individuals’ – while the racial 
characteristics of the rest become hyper-visible.  
That this has happened is easy enough to establish: we need only trawl 
through classic texts in liberal and egalitarian theory. The more challenging claim is 
that it is impossible to construct disembodied conceptions of the individual without 
introducing some kind of hierarchy, or some version of an us/ them differentiation. 
The claim here is that we cannot consistently think outside the constraints of lived, 
embodied, experience, and that somewhere along the line, particular kinds of bodies 
and particular kinds of people are going to enter into even the most abstract of 
conceptions. In any given society, there may be some abstractions we can genuinely 
                                                 
29 Carole Pateman (1988) The Sexual Contract Cambridge: Polity Press; Charles W Mills (1997) The 
Racial Contract Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Charles W. Mills (2005) ‘”Ideal Theory” as 
Ideology’ Hypatia, 20.3: 165-184. For a discussion of the relationship between their ideas, see also 
Pateman and Mills ( 2007) Contract and Domination Cambridge: Polity Press.  
30 Nirmal Puwar (2004) Space Invaders: Race, Gender,and Bodies Out of Place Berg. 
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manage: it might be, for example, that in a society where nothing at all attached to 
whether people believed in god or which god they believed in, we could construct an 
image of the citizen that in no way privileged one religious group over another. It 
might be (I find this even harder to imagine) that in some future world where nothing 
attached to gender, we would be able to talk of the rights of the individual or roles of 
the citizen without in any way conjuring up either a male or female norm. The notion, 
however, that we can achieve the necessary distance simply by the act of abstraction - 
simply through the power of thought - is almost certainly mistaken. We live our lives 
as embodied individuals, and cannot so readily separate out mind from body.  
 How might this kind of argument link to the idealisations and abstractions of 
the market? This is not, remember, a question about whether actual markets 
correspond to what is offered as the hypothetical or ideal: as in the parallel of the 
abstract individual or citizen, the whole point of the abstraction is that it isn’t intended 
to correspond. Nor is it even a question about whether some contingent aspect of 
existing markets has been mistakenly attached to the depictions of the ideal. If that 
were the issue, the feminist critique of the abstract individual would simply be that 
liberals talked of the individual but in practice really meant white men; or talked of 
the individual but in practice meant heads of household. That has of course been 
said,31 but if that were all, it would be open to liberals to dismiss this as the bad old 
history of the tradition, and one that today’s liberals can put behind them. By 
extension, it would be open to theorists of the market to apologise for slipping in 
specific aspects of particular markets when they talked of the virtues of the market, 
and promise to do better next time. The question is not whether actual markets 
correspond to the ideal type (clearly, they don’t). The deeper question is whether, 
even in the most abstract formulations of ‘the market’, certain kinds of norms creep 
in.  
In the ‘pure’ model of economic theory – taken over, I would suggest, in much 
of the Rawlsian deployment of the market - this is not supposed to happen. Prices, for 
example, are not supposed to reflect the costs of production, and certainly not the 
intrinsic (or worse still, moral) value of a commodity, but simply the current 
equilibrium between supply and demand. There is no ‘right’ price. As Hayek put it, 
‘current prices… have no necessary relation to what has been done in the past in order 
                                                 
31 For example, in Susan Moller Okin’s critique of Rawls in Justice, Gender and the Family Basic 
Books, 1989. 
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to bring the current supply of any particular good on the market’,32  for however 
much effort it took to produce a particular commodity, the good becomes worthless if 
no-one now wants it.  If preferences change and demand collapses, so too will the 
market value. If demand rises without a corresponding increase in supply, so too will 
the price. Norms of fairness are not supposed to play any role in this.  
But just as it is hard to imagine an individual without that individual assuming 
embodied form, so it is hard to conceive of market transactions taking place 
unmediated in any way by norms, codes, social conventions or expectations.33 
Geoffrey Hodgson defines the market ‘as a set of social institutions in which a large 
number of commodity exchanges of a specific type regularly take place, and are to 
some extent are facilitated and structured by those institutions.’34 In this 
understanding of the market – considerably more plausible than the abstractions of the 
pure model - the social institutions and conventions, which will vary through time, 
cannot be separated from what makes market transactions work. Prices, including 
prices for labour, are not established in a vacuum. In particular, people will have prior 
notions as to what is a reasonable price for a particular good or service, or a 
reasonable wage for a particular job; and as feminists have commonly argued, this 
latter will often incorporate historically generated norms about men’s and women’s 
work.35 Employers will commonly take account of prevailing norms in setting rates 
for a job, and suppliers will commonly take account of them in setting prices for 
services or goods. Representing these socially generated ideas of worth as external to 
the operations of the market – perhaps as historical contingencies, or leftovers from 
some pre-market past – simply presumes in advance that we can sensibly talk of a 
‘pure’ market untouched by these. 
In ‘Economists Favour the Price System – Who Else Does?’, Bruno Frey 
discusses the example of a Toronto hardware store that raised the price for snow 
shovels from $15 to $20 after a heavy snow storm, and was roundly condemned by 
Toronto residents who regarded this as ‘unfair’ practice.36  In the idealised market, 
raising prices is an entirely appropriate response to a shortage in supply. This sends 
out signals to hardware stores in other towns that it might now be worth their while to 
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ship in some of their own snow shovels; sends out messages to poorer consumers that 
they might now be better off making their own shovels; and generally brings about a 
new equilibrium of supply and demand at a new price. In reality, however, norms of 
fairness may constrain what suppliers will do. They may fear losing the good will of 
their customers if they engage in what is seen as sharp practice, and may not raise 
prices every time there is a shortage even if the result is that customers have to queue 
and that some of those willing to buy at a higher price go without. Norms of fairness, 
including norms of what people do or do not deserve for their work, play a part in 
establishing prices even within market systems. If so, the question of what these 
norms are – and whether they are legitimate – remains a central issue. 
The further point raised by Hampsher- Monk is that the neutrality claim often 
made on behalf of markets may be incoherent, because markets must either presume 
or else promote particular norms. If prices do not reflect intrinsic value, but are simply 
the outcome of myriad consumer preferences, this clearly means there is no such thing 
as a ‘natural’ price. In principle, any commodity can attract any price, and it all comes 
down to the relationship between consumer preferences and what is currently 
available for sale. But in that case, he argues, there is no reason to rule out people 
paying a premium for their prejudices –employers paying more to have men working 
for them rather than women, for example, or shoppers paying more to buy their goods 
from white sales assistants rather than black. More precisely, the only reason why this 
could not happen would be if the preference for maximising one’s money holdings 
always wins out over what we might term a preference for discrimination. Yet if we 
think of the preference for maximising money holdings and the preference for 
discrimination just as two different preferences – as the market model, with its 
supposed lack of interest in the nature of preferences, would seem to suggest – it is 
not obvious that we can assume that everyone wants the first. ‘If it turned out to be 
empirically demonstrable that paradigmatically free markets did, as a matter of fact, 
erode discriminatory… preferences while sustaining narrowly ‘economic’ ones, this 
would, ironically, disprove the claim that the market mediated neutrally between 
participants’ preference schedules.’ 37 Either the ideal type of the market assumes that 
we will prefer money to our prejudices (in which case it has imported a substantive 
                                                 
37 Hampsher-Monk: 42 
 15
norm).Or actual markets actively encourage us to do so (in which case they cannot be 
neutral and agnostic between preferences).  
Both Rawls and Dworkin rule out the impact of prejudice – Rawls through a 
principle of fair equality of opportunity, Dworkin through a principle of independence 
that rules out auction bids that fail to treat members of the community with equal 
concern – so my point here is not that either lacks the intellectual resources to 
challenge discrimination. The point, rather, is that markets cannot be conceived as 
neutral devices generating principles of equitable treatment when they operate 
through historically specific conventions and norms that may or may not (and this 
then becomes a historical, not conceptual question) promote equality. The relevance 
of this should become clear in my final section.  
 
2. Rawls’ contrast between ideal and non-ideal theory 
In the figures of the individual and citizen, or the abstraction of the market as 
discussed above, the abstraction is not intended to carry any normative implications. It 
is ‘ideal’ simply in the sense of being an ideal type, supposedly stripped of 
contingency and accident. In Rawls’ formulation, by contrast, ideal theory refers 
simultaneously to an abstraction from reality and to what is normatively ideal. Ideal 
theory is said to provide us with the principles of justice or morality appropriate to a 
world in which institutions and individuals already comply with the obligations of 
justice or morality. It deals, that is, with the principles of justice in a well-ordered 
society where ‘everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just 
institutions’.38  
The plausible object of this idealisation is to abstract from the effects of 
inequitable institutions or the problem of ‘bad’ people so as to focus our minds on 
what justice requires. So we would not, for example, ask what counts as a fair 
university admissions policy in a world marked by major inequalities of wealth (that 
being a problem for non-ideal theory), but would assume that the economic system 
was just, and focus on what ought in this context to be the procedures governing 
university admissions. We would not ask whether it was fair to require people to tell 
the truth when everyone around them is an expert in deception, but would work out 
the rules governing truth-telling on the assumption that everyone was complying with 
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them. Rawls sometimes talks as if non-ideal theory is about the principles we need to 
deal with injustice (comprising ‘the theory of punishments, the doctrine of just war, 
the justification of the various ways of opposing unjust regimes’39) as if the spheres of 
ideal and non-ideal theory refer to entirely different domains. At other points – more 
helpfully, in my view - he represents non-ideal theory as dealing with the adjustments 
we have to make to ideal theory when faced with ‘natural limitations and historical 
contingencies’.40  
Rawls is somewhat opaque in explaining how ideal theory then informs non-
ideal, but we can derive a useful illustration from Cecile Fabre’s investigation of what 
rights individuals have as regards the provision of bodily services, and whether it is 
permissible to sell body parts. Fabre begins from what she describes as ideal theory: ‘I 
assume that individuals’ needs for material resources are already met, so that no one 
lacks, through no fault of their own, access to housing, minimum income, or the kind 
of health care which does not necessitate body parts.’41 The point of this abstraction is 
to help us work out exactly what it is we object to when we object to certain kinds of 
bodily transactions. If we were judging the acceptability of organ sales in the context 
of the ‘real’ world, where some people are so impoverished that they risk death to sell 
kidneys to rich invalids, and where the trade in body parts involves fraud, 
manipulation of the most vulnerable, and organised crime, we might conclude –but 
perhaps too readily - that the sale of body parts is morally indefensible. The 
abstractions of ideal theory enable us to work out whether our objections lie in those 
facts of global inequality, or in more contestable claims about the integrity of the 
person being bound up in the integrity of the body, or people not having the right to 
dispose of their bodies as they wish. The abstraction asks us to set to one side, for 
later consideration, all those objections that stem from the imperfections of 
contemporary society.  
This looks helpful as a way of clarifying intuitions about justice, and I would 
not want to rule it out as a useful theoretical device. But it begs the question (asked by 
other contributors to this issue) of whether the intuitions formed under the assumption 
of compliance can provide a useful guide to the dilemmas that face us in the non-
compliant world. Those defending ideal theory recognise, of course, that we may have 
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to modify the initial principles once we add in the facts of non-compliance. We might, 
for example, decide to ban the sale of body parts, even if we have concluded that 
individuals have a moral right to buy and sell, because of the risks of encouraging 
what is currently an unscrupulous trade. The issue is not whether ideal theory can ever 
make itself more realistic, can ever move beyond the first stage. The question is 
whether this way of setting things up –first check out the moral intuitions under 
conditions of abstraction, then see if other considerations alter the picture – already 
rigs the outcome in a particular way.42  
In discussions of the market, economists very commonly make a Rawlsian 
’ideal theory’ manoeuvre when they discuss the appropriateness of the price 
mechanism in such matters as reducing congestion on the roads or cutting carbon 
emissions. They assume, most notably, that the distribution of incomes is equal. They 
take the complications of income inequality out of the picture - in Rawlsian language, 
they assume compliance - and then consider the advantages of rationing through the 
price system against the risks of rationing through direct regulation. Under the 
assumption of equal incomes, the price mechanism always wins. It turns out to be 
fairer, more effective, better for the environment, better for everyone, to impose, say, 
a congestion charge on all cars entering a crowded city than to ration entry according 
to registration numbers, or increase subsidies on public transport, or build more roads. 
To put a Dworkinian gloss this, those who really appreciate the privacy and 
convenience of a car, will be prepared to pay the premium, while those who attach 
more value to other things will happily travel by bus; neither envies the other’s choice 
and  there are fewer cars on the road.  
The worried social critic then points out that incomes are not equal, and that 
congestion charges effectively deny access to motorists on low incomes while making 
the drive into the city a more delightful experience for those who can afford to pay. In 
my experience, the economist typically replies that this is a separate or subsequent 
matter, to be dealt with by some compensatory policy for the poorest, or through 
redistributive taxation. The point to note is that it is very rare for the complications 
attached to an unequal distribution of income to lead to serious reconsideration of the 
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policy selected under ‘ideal’ conditions. If so, it looks as if the initial abstraction is 
not just simplifying the picture in order to clarify the issues at stake. It is loading the 
dice in favour of a particular solution.  
In political, as opposed to economic theory, the tendency has mostly been in 
the opposite direction, with the market model abandoned or overridden at the point 
where its implications conflict with other moral intuitions. This makes it a lot more 
palatable – but leaves one wondering just how useful the hypothetical model has been. 
Consider Dworkin’s application of the hypothetical insurance model to health care. 
He makes three idealising assumptions: that the resources people can command are as 
nearly equal as possible; that everyone has state-of-the-art knowledge about the costs 
and side-effects of particular medical procedures; and that no-one has access to 
information about the susceptibility of particular individuals to particular diseases. 
With these assumptions in place, the market model is supposed to aid collective 
decision making about medical expenditure by modelling what choices prudent 
individuals would make if they knew they had to carry the costs of their choices 
themselves. Dworkin argues, for example, that very high levels of medical 
expenditure in the US reflect the fact that most decisions about the purchase of health 
care are made by patients and doctors, while the costs are borne by insurance 
companies, ‘so that those who make the decisions have no direct incentive to save 
money’.43 The object of the market model – and this is familiar terrain from neo-
classical economics - is to promote decisions that more genuinely reflect ‘what people 
would decide to spend on their own medical care, as individuals, if they were buying 
insurance under fair free-market conditions’.44
       In his discussion of this, Lesley Jacobs has argued that it is impossible to say that 
health care decisions should reflect what well informed people, carrying the real costs 
of their preferences, would choose and that there should be universal access to health 
care.45 The implication of the first, he suggests, is that even health benefits ought to 
be paid in convertible cash, and once that happens, it will no longer be possible to 
maintain a universal health service. There seem no good grounds, for example, for 
refusing the AIDS patient who says he prefers to take certain resources in cash rather 
than see the money spent on expensive medical equipment that might only marginally 
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prolong his life. There therefore seems no basis on which a Dworkinian egalitarian 
can insist that all sick people have access to health care. Dworkin replies (reasonably 
enough) that a government committed to equality of resources can still constrain 
choices in some circumstances, and can legitimately decide that health insurance 
should be mandatory, not therefore exchangeable for cash. Apart from paternalistic 
reasons – which he does not rule out - sick citizens are expensive, and ‘particularly 
expensive to a community of decent people who will not let the indigent die or suffer 
for lack of medical care’.46  
I share Dworkin’s substantive position on this, but it seems to me that his 
response still leaves Jacobs essentially right. If one of the justifications for the market 
model is that it respects our personal judgments on what something is worth to us, it 
should in principle take its even-handedness all the way down. If even a broadly anti-
paternalist like Dworkin is unwilling to pursue this to its conclusion, preferring to 
override the strict market model at the point where it conflicts with other moral 
intuitions (like those of a ‘community of decent people’), then the hypothetical market 
is doing less of the normative work than was originally proclaimed. Unlike their 
libertarian counterparts, liberal egalitarians do not back themselves into indefensible 
positions through their deployment of the market model. They typically stop short of 
this, either stressing the enormous gap between their idealising assumptions and 
current realities, or – as seems to be happening in this instance - drawing on some 
additional moral intuition that justifies a departure from market norms. That they stop 
short of unpalatable conclusions is part of what confirms them as egalitarians. The 
worry, then, is not so much that endorsement of the market model commits liberal 
egalitarians to more inequalities than they desired or intended, for they always have a 
get-out clause when that point is reached. The worry is that endorsement of the 
market model may blind them to more radical alternatives.  
This is where an earlier point about needing to focus more on the substance of 
market relations rather than just general principles of market exchange becomes 
especially pertinent. There has been a lot of discussion in recent years about the 
narrow distributional paradigm of much contemporary egalitarianism: the tendency to 
theorise equality as a fair distribution of things, rather than as equality in 
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relationships.47  One of the strengths of the alternative ‘relational’ approach is that it 
directs attention to the substance of market relations, focusing on the power 
hierarchies involved in particular wage contracts or the social disrespect involved in 
particular consumer relations, and arguing that these are as important in the 
delineation of an egalitarian society as the distribution of material resources.  In the 
more abstract endorsements of ‘the market’, the nature of social relations, including 
whether they involve hierarchies of power, is less to the fore. While the average 
liberal egalitarian will readily abandon the market model when it leads to what she 
regards as unacceptable inequalities in distribution, she may not be so quick to notice 
unacceptable hierarchies of power or respect.   
 
3 Ideal theory and the fact/value distinction 
There is a third, looser, notion of ideal theory that comes into play when people say 
we need to work out the ideals of justice or equality –the dreams of paradise -  before 
testing these against considerations of feasibility. The argument here is not that 
sustaining a clear distinction between ideal and non-ideal helps clarify the grounds of 
our intuitions about justice, but that starting from the constraints of the non-ideal 
world can so much lessen our ambitions that we end up commending only some 
mildly improved version of the status quo. John Roemer, for one, argues ‘that one 
must know what the ethically desirable policy is before compromising for the sake of 
political reality. Let us not mix ethics and political pragmatism, but rather remain 
clear on the distinction between what is right and what compromises are necessary, 
because our societies have not yet embraced what is right.’48 Cohen, too, argues for a 
clear distinction between the demands of equality and justice, and perceptions of what 
is politically feasible. He acknowledges, after all, that incentives are necessary to 
motivate higher levels of production, and it might be said that if he accepts that 
necessity for incentives, then his critique of their moral grounding is a bit beside the 
point. But it is important for Cohen not to mis-describe a compromise with the 
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patterns of motivation currently characteristic of market societies as if this represents 
real principles of justice. ‘Philosophers in search of justice should not be content with 
an expedient compromise.’49  
Again, we can see the point. Anyone who lived through the heady decades of 
the 1960s and 70s will be aware of a radical curtailment of egalitarian and democratic 
ambitions that has occurred since that period. Questions of feasibility have pushed 
considerations of justice off the agenda, and worries about appearing foolishly utopian 
have supplanted worries about not being radical enough. Previously significant 
discourses on the role of utopias in stretching the imagination and breaking the 
confines of hegemonic thought have fallen out of fashion, and the range of considered 
alternatives has very significantly narrowed. With this closure of possibilities in mind, 
there seems good reason to promote more ideal theory, not less. When considering the 
first two meanings attached to ideal theory, I suggested that its deployment could 
encourage too much tolerance of market pricing or market models. In this third 
meaning, ideal theory is designed precisely to challenge that tendency by pushing 
questions of feasibility (including questions of market efficiency) into second place. It 
would then be entirely coherent to challenge the first two versions of ideal theory 
while wholeheartedly embracing the third.  
Yet when applied to the market, there are also problems here, for the 
separation between ideal and delivery can encourage a fact/value distinction that 
reinforces notions of the market as a relatively neutral tool. This, in a sense, has been 
the strategy of post Rawlsian egalitarians, who recommend leaving the market to do 
its work in generating the wealth, while drawing on ideal theory to identify the 
appropriate principles for taxation and redistribution. This is a clear implication of the 
now widespread compensation discourse, for compensation is usually understood as 
something that occurs after the event, and is therefore separated in time as well as 
conceptually from the process of wealth generation. It also tends to be the message of 
the alternative discourse of equality of opportunity, for example in Roemer’s work, 
where the object of criticism is not so much the market system of rewarding 
occupations (which may simply reflect laws of supply and demand), but the tendency 
to reward certain types of people differently even when they have put in identical 
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amounts of effort.50 For Roemer, the equalising adjustments are better timed before 
the event than after, for example, through hefty public spending on the education of 
those social groups whose efforts still leave them clustering in the ranks of the 
unemployed or lowest paid. But whether the language is of compensation or equality 
of opportunity, there is a tendency to separate out the norms that should regulate 
distribution and/or re-distribution from the practicalities that supposedly govern 
production. 
Whether we can usefully separate out the principles that regulate production 
from those that regulate distribution has long been an issue in Marxist debate; and is 
part of what is currently at issue in arguments between distributional and relational 
conceptions of equality. The other main worry is that the separation understates the 
impact that living in a market society has on norms of fairness or equality, and 
presumes too readily that it is possible to pick out the ‘good’ elements of a market 
society while discarding or modifying the ‘bad’. If the market is not, as I have 
suggested, simply an organising tool with semi-miraculous qualities of efficiency, but 
a set of institutions and conventions that embody their own norms, this ‘pick and 
choose’ approach to the market may not be so readily available.  
Markets are only able to operate because of the codes and conventions that 
inform and regulate market behaviour. These conventions are not amoral, but likely, 
on the contrary, to involve particular norms, including particular understandings of 
desert. If so, then one of the major difficulties in welding strong conceptions of 
equality onto a market system of pricing and rewards is that markets may encourage 
precisely those notions of personal entitlement that egalitarians have been trying to 
challenge over the last three decades. In particular, the very experience of living in a 
market society may make the average citizen cling more firmly than ever to the notion 
that she does indeed deserve what she gets on the market. And the more we hear 
about the supposed fairness or neutrality of the market, the more convinced we may 
become that what falls into our lap by virtue of a relatively untrammelled market is, 
fairly, ours. 
I do not mean, by this, that people living in market-dominated societies 
become incapable of formulating any criticism of the inequalities they see around 
them: this is patently not the case. People very commonly espouse moderate through 
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to radical notions of equality of opportunity. They commonly think it unfair when two 
people who have worked equally hard end up with very different earning potential, 
just because one was fortunate enough to be sent to a well resourced private school 
and the other grew up on a sink estate. To this extent, they share with contemporary 
liberal egalitarians the perception that people should not suffer because of their bad 
luck; though they tend to be more tolerant of the idea that people can benefit from 
good luck, and less convinced than the typical post-Rawlsian egalitarian of the 
unfairness of one person being born more talented than another. It is evident, 
moreover, that many people living in market-dominated societies regard the 
extraordinary recent payments to top executives as illegitimate,51 which suggests 
considerable resistance to market principles of reward. Yet when we consider this last, 
it seems more likely that criticisms of company executives arise because they are seen 
as people using their positions of power to pay themselves obscene amounts of 
money. They are seen, in other words, as examples of what goes wrong when 
something other than the market is at work. Even in their criticisms, people can then 
be said to reproduce market ideas of fairness. The norms against which they assess 
actual transactions are deeply embedded in the practices of market exchange.  
Marx argued in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875) that equal right 
can never be higher than the economic structure of the society in which it is 
formulated, and that in a society still stamped by its birth marks from capitalism, it 
will be impossible to think beyond the principle that regulates the exchange of 
commodities, the principle of exchanging equal for equal. This aspect of Marx’s claim 
continues to ring true, for markets do seem to sustain a particular conception of 
equality, a notion of equality as getting back the equivalent of what you gave.  
That focus on equivalence is one of the things Dworkin likes about markets, 
for it is said to force us to think about the ‘real’ cost of our choices, and real burden 
they impose on others, and weigh up whether a particular expenditure of effort or 
resources really is worth a particular outcome. Within the limits of this equivalence, it 
is clearly possible to think critically about how markets work: I am not offering a 
fatalistic argument in which no-one ever raises her sights above the limits of market 
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exchange. As Frey’s example indicates, non-economists tend to dislike the classically 
market ideal of suppliers rationing scarce goods by putting up their prices, while the 
average economist sees this as better than making people queue or issuing ration 
cards. If markets do promote and sustain particular understandings of fairness, it 
seems they can simultaneously sustain the non-economist’s idea that prices should 
reflect costs of production (because consumers ought to pay suppliers the equivalent 
of what it cost them to produce),  and the economist’s idea that it is fair for suppliers 
to put up prices when shortages occur (because if people are willing to pay those 
prices, they must see the money they pay out as equivalent to the satisfaction they  
anticipate from the purchase). Note, however, that both these rest on notions of 
equivalence, on getting back the equivalent of what you gave. There is scope for 
interpreting and reinterpreting that norm, scope for competing understandings of 
equivalence. But it would be an enormous leap from either of the above to something 
like the classically Marxist decoupling of input and rewards (‘from each according to 
his ability, to each according to his needs’), or to what Cohen once described as the 
anti-market principle ‘according to which I serve you not because of what I can get 
out of doing so but because you need my service’.52 It is a pretty big leap even to the 
position so many egalitarians have tried to sustain over recent years, in which people 
are no longer entitled to rewards that flow from the exercise of their own talents.  
The third argument in favour of ideal theory is that maintaining a clear 
distinction between ideals and conditions of implementation helps immunise us 
against the tendency to reduced ambition. The distinction asks us to work out our 
values in isolation from, or at least prior to, addressing the facts, but in doing so, it 
encourages us to think of these ‘facts’ as having no normative content. Ironically, it 
then reinforces a tendency to think of the market as inherently neutral between 
different distributions of resources or different conceptions of the good, as something 
we can make use of for efficiency (and in Dworkin’s argument, also equality) 
purposes without detracting from or reshaping our normative goals. My suggestion 
here is that markets do not just generate actual inequalities. The norms and 
conventions that constitute actual markets also generate understandings of and 
attitudes towards equality, inclining us to think about fairness and justice in particular 
ways. If so, it is unclear how useful it can be to construct ideals of justice or equality 
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in abstraction from the circumstances under which they are likely to be implemented. 
The separation into two stages looks particularly problematic when it encourages 
representations of the market as a relatively neutral tool.  
 
Conclusion 
The rapprochement between egalitarians and the market might, in many ways, be 
taken as a counter-trend to the supposed dominance of ideal theory, indicating a 
concern with what is feasible, and a willingness to accommodate ideals to reality. 
This would be a superficial interpretation. In any deeper sense, the flirtation with 
market metaphors and market models rests on a highly abstract understanding of ‘the 
market’. In her defence of abstraction, Onora O’Neill distinguished between an 
idealisation that ascribes false predicates (thus clearly to be avoided) and an 
abstraction that brackets, rather than denying, certain predicates in order to achieve 
theoretical advance.53 As she suggests, bracketing per se is unavoidable: any theory 
that tried to capture every detail of the phenomena it was analysing would be not a 
theory but a photograph (and as such, also selective and ‘false’). But the bracketing 
required to produce the abstraction of ‘the market’  - like the bracketing required to 
produce ‘the citizen’ or ‘the individual’ -  cannot be regarded as neutral in its effects. 
It brackets off the norms and conventions that regulate the behaviour of markets, 
including substantive norms about what it is reasonable to pay people or what counts 
as fair exchange, and in doing so misrepresents markets as more even-handed 
between different reward systems than is the case. It also brackets off the distribution 
of income for later consideration. In doing so, it biases policy recommendations in 
particular – usually less socially ambitious - directions.  
Few people today imagine solutions that disregard the market: pretty much all 
of us recognise that the societies we live in will continue to be organised on broadly 
market principles for as long as we can anticipate. What that means, however, is that 
differences between actual markets, between, that is, one kind of market society and 
another, become increasingly important in the formulation of egalitarian alternatives. 
My argument, in this paper, is that certain idealised ways of talking about ‘the market’ 
do not help this process. The prospects for a more egalitarian, but still in some sense 
market, society must surely lie in differentiating more precisely the positive or 
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genuinely neutral aspects of market exchange from those that are at most odds with 
equality, and then working to reduce or eliminate the latter. Talk of the market as 
ideal type encourages us to think we can produce these differentiations directly out of 
our definitions, putting all the good or neutral aspects on the one side and relegating 
all the bad to the other. This is not a useful way to address the task of transforming 
actual market societies in a more egalitarian direction.  
 
 
